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CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE OF LAND: UNDERSTANDING THE IMPECUNIOSITY DEFENCE 
 
 
Dr David Capper, Reader in Law, Queen’s University Belfast 
 
 
The Great Recession from which some western economies are slowly and painfully emerging 
was accompanied by a considerable fall in real estate asset prices.  That fall was preceded by 
a considerable rise in those same asset prices.  Beyond question that rise encouraged many 
people to buy houses, apartments and other landed property, sometimes stretching their 
ability to pay to and beyond realistic limits.  The subsequent fall placed many of these 
purchasers in positions where they were unable to pay the contract price of the property they 
were purchasing.  This was sometimes because their jobs or livelihoods were lost in the 
economic recession caused to some extent by the property collapse and in other cases 
because they were unable to borrow enough to fund the purchase.  A lender will demand 
security for the loan required to purchase the property but will lend against the value of the 
property and not the contract sale price.  Where an apartment for example is sold ‘off the 
plans’ before the apartment building is constructed, a process that may take about two years, 
the market value of that dwelling may be appreciably more or less than the contract price 
when the time comes to complete the contract.  If it is less and the purchaser is unable to 
raise close to the full contract price on mortgage and has no other assets that can be easily 
liquidised, he or she may be unable to complete the purchase.  If the contract contains a 
‘subject to finance’ clause the purchaser will be able to walk away from the purchase without 
penalty but in many of the cases that will be discussed below there was no ‘subject to finance’ 
clause in the contract and purchasers remained bound to complete.  
 
In most common law jurisdictions the usual remedy for breach of a contract for the sale of an 
interest in land remains specific performance, whether the party in breach is vendor or 
purchaser.  As the vendor’s interest is purely financial, in a rising market the vendor will often 
be content to forfeit the purchaser’s deposit and resell.  But in the falling market conditions 
of recent times the forfeiting of a deposit has not always made up for the difference between 
contract price and current realistic resale price and so this has proved to be an unattractive 
remedy for vendors.  Vendors have thus tended to sue for specific performance of the 
contract or for damages in lieu of specific performance.  Often the vendor will be aware that 
the purchaser is going to plead impecuniosity as their defence but not all vendors have been 
prepared to accept that the purchaser is unable to pay, and so they commence immediate 
negotiations for the release of the purchaser from his or her obligations.  This is not 
necessarily unreasonable because some purchasers have been known to find appreciating 
assets affordable but the same asset unaffordable once it depreciates.1  The purchaser’s 
circumstances may not otherwise have changed significantly since the contract was signed 
and he or she may have other assets that if liquidised would allow for completion of the 
purchase.  So litigation often ensues and this question of whether the purchaser really cannot 
raise the money to complete the purchase has to be confronted.   
 
                                                          
1 This was so in the New Zealand case of Wealth Buy Property Ltd v Stevenson [2012] NZHC 1609.   
The fall in property markets provides an excellent opportunity to review developments in the 
law governing the specific performance of contracts for the sale of land, especially those 
relating to purchasers’ difficulties in raising the purchase money.  Three approaches to 
specific performance will be discussed, giving consideration both to their general merits and 
to their utility in terms of addressing the impecuniosity problem.  The first approach 
considered is one followed by courts in both Irish jurisdictions and also to a wide extent in 
Australia and New Zealand.  This is the recognition of a specific ‘impecuniosity’ defence to a 
vendor’s specific performance application, where the court will refuse specific performance 
and leave the vendor to a remedy in damages where it appears that the purchaser is simply 
unable to pay the price.  The extent to which this defence is truly an ‘impossibility’ defence 
will be discussed, or whether ‘impossibility’ really means ‘extreme hardship’.  Discussion of 
the second and third approaches below consider whether this housing crisis and the 
‘impecuniosity’ defence above represent an opportunity to think again about specific 
performance in the context of contracts for the sale of an interest in land.  The second 
approach considers a development from Canada where the Semelhago principle holds that 
specific performance should not be the preferred remedy for breach of such contracts, no 
matter whether the applicant be the vendor or the purchaser.  The third approach accepts 
that specific performance should continue to be the preferred remedy for purchasers but 
challenges the assumptions based on the mutuality principle that it should continue to be the 
normal remedy for vendors.  The latter is the approach recommended as the way forward in 
this area.  But first some more of the wider economic context affecting this debate will be 
sketched out in a little more detail. 
        
 
Housing as an Investment Asset 
 
 
Home ownership is the dominant form of housing in most western societies.  The sources 
drawn upon in this section are British and Irish but there is no reason to suppose that the 
phenomena highlighted are not replicated at least to the level of noteworthy feature in the 
housing provision of other common law jurisdictions. 
 
In the United Kingdom the growth in home ownership began after the First World War.  In 
1919 about 90% of households in the United Kingdom were privately rented.2  Rent controls 
imposed through the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Restriction Act 19153 and subsequent 
enactments made private letting unprofitable for landlords.  Council housing began taking the 
place of private letting after the First World War and home ownership became the experience 
for most who could afford it.  By 1979 when the Thatcher government came to power owner 
occupied homes comprised 55% of all homes in Britain, with public rented accommodation 
coming to 32% and the private rented sector 13%.4  Conservative housing policies, largely 
followed by Labour after 1997, favoured home ownership and resulted in the transfer of some 
2 million council houses to home ownership under ‘right to buy’ schemes.  By 2001 the level 
                                                          
2 ADH Crook & PA Kemp, ‘The revival of private rented housing in Britain’ (1996) Housing Studies 11:1, 51. 
3 This was a war time measure designed to maintain morale among serving soldiers. 
4 David Mullins & Alan Murie, Housing Policy in the UK (2006, Palgrave Macmillan), 36. 
of home ownership in Britain had reached 69.4%.5  In Ireland the 2006 Census indicated a 
75% incidence of home ownership.  Rural (farming) home ownership is largely the product of 
the Land Purchase Scheme of the early twentieth century which bought out the landlords of 
large estates and enabled tenant farmers to purchase their farms on long term mortgages.  In 
urban areas a mixture of local authority housing and government subsidised owner occupied 
housing was the order of the day from independence until the Celtic Tiger housing boom 
began in the 1990s.6 
 
The growth in home ownership in the United Kingdom and Ireland has been accompanied by 
two features of the housing markets in those countries that are very significant in terms of 
the issues discussed in this article.  The first feature is the increasing tendency to view housing 
not just as a place to live but as an investment asset.  The second feature is the enormous rise 
in the price of housing, particularly in Ireland, and its connection with investment driven 
speculation on the property market. 
 
In Britain Conservative governments of the 1950s, early 1970s and the 1980s and 1990s 
strongly favoured home ownership in preference to the more welfare state provision that 
council housing was perceived to be.7  Paying rent was ‘dead money’ and owning one’s home 
offered security for retirement because the mortgage would be paid before income was 
reduced and the state was relieved of the duty to house people in old age.  The Labour 
governments of 1997-2010 adopted this housing policy8 and applied it as a means of welfare 
provision.  Instead of the state making welfare provision directly through taxation New Labour 
facilitated citizen access to asset-based welfare through housing.9  Professor Susan Smith has 
shown that the experience of many people living in Britain in the 1990s and 2000s was that 
the value of their homes was rising faster than their incomes.  This enabled them to fund 
spending for now and saving for the future by taking out mortgages in excess of home values 
and by re-mortgaging.  A house became not just a place to live but an investment asset to 
spend.10  In stimulating a buy-to-rent market this phenomenon has resulted in the purchase 
of housing purely as an investment. 
                                                          
5 Ibid, 49.  Local authority housing stood at 14.5%, housing association 6.5%, and the private rented sector the 
remainder. 
6 PJ Drudy & Michael Punch, ‘Housing Models and Inequality: Perspectives on Recent Irish Experience’ (2002) 
Housing Studies 17:4, 657, 663-664; Padraic Kenna, Housing Law, Rights and Policy (2011, Clarus Press), ch 2. 
7 Houses: the Next Step (Cmnd 8996, HMSO, 1953); Minister for Housing and Local Government, House Purchase 
(Cmnd 571, Sessional Papers, HMSO, 1958); Department of the Environment, Fair Deal for Housing (Cmnd 6851, 
HMSO, 1971); Department of the Environment, Our Future Homes (Cm 2901, HMSO, 1995). 
8 Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, Extending Home Ownership for All (HMSO, 2005); Sustainable 
Communities: Homes for All (A Five Year Plan from the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister) (HMSO, 2005).  
9 Ray Forrest and Yosuke Hirayama, ‘The Uneven Impact of Neoliberalism on Housing Opportunities’ (2009) 33 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 998; Alan Finlayson, ‘Financialisation, Financial Literacy 
and Asset-Based Welfare’ (2009) 11 British Journal of Politics and International Relations 400; Matthew Watson, 
‘Constituting Monetary Conservatives via the ‘Savings Habit’: New Labour and the British Housing Bubble’ (2008) 
Comparative European Politics 285; Matthew Watson, ‘Planning for a Future of Asset-based Welfare?  New 
Labour, Financialized Economic Agency and the Housing Market’ (2009) 24 Planning, Practice & Research 41.  
10 SJ Smith, Banking on housing?  Speculating on the role and relevance of housing wealth in Britain (2005, paper 
prepared for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Durham University); Susan J. Smith, ‘Risky Business? The 
Challenge of Residential Mortgage Markets’ (2005) Housing Finance International 3; Susan J. Smith, Nicole Cook 
and Beverley A. Searle, From canny consumer to care-full citizen: towards a nation of home stewardship? (2006, 
ESRC/AHRC Cultures of Consumption Programme Working Paper from the Project Banking on Housing; Spending 
the Home RES-154-24-0012); Susan J. Smith, ‘Owner-occupation: at home with a hybrid of money and materials’ 
 
The Irish property bubble of the 1990s and 2000s very clearly illustrates the baneful 
consequences of rising house prices and rampant property speculation.  Between 1991 and 
2006 the population of the Republic of Ireland grew by 20% from 3.525 million to 4.239 
million, with the number of households rising from 1.029 million to 1.473 million.11  The 
national housing stock grew by 60% between 1992 and 200712 and about one quarter of the 
country’s total housing stock of 1.92 million homes in 2008 had been built since 2002.13  About 
one quarter of the country’s new housing stock built between 2003 and 2009 was in 
apartments14 and these accounted for 10% of total housing stock.15  A phenomenal surge in 
apartment building also occurred in Belfast in Northern Ireland although accurate statistics 
do not appear to be available.  Real incomes doubled between 1997 and 200716 but average 
new house prices rose fourfold during that time and second hand homes more than fivefold.17  
Between 1994 and 2004 new house prices rose over four times as much as building costs and 
seven times faster than the Consumer Price Index.18  The Economist produced an index of 
house prices in June 2005 which showed that in 1997-2005 Ireland had the highest rate of 
price increase (192%) of all developed countries, followed next by Britain (154%),19 and in 
2007 the International Monetary Fund estimated that houses in Ireland were about 32% over-
valued.20  Many of the new homes constructed in Ireland during this period and a considerable 
number of others were purchased purely as investments,21 and beyond doubt speculation has 
contributed significantly to the price rise.  The social costs of this bubble and its subsequent 
burst have been enormous, especially in terms of making much owner occupied housing 
unaffordable for many first time buyers, the level of household debt and negative equity, long 
commutes to work in Dublin from more affordable parts of the country, dislocation of family 
life and health problems. 
 
The significance of the above in terms of the issues addressed in this article is essentially that 
the context in which a vendor’s application for specific performance and the purchaser’s 
defence of impecuniosity arise are potentially very important to the approach the court 
should take.  A young couple buying an apartment as a residence because this is all they think 
they can afford would appear to deserve rather more in the way of understanding should they 
find that they cannot raise the finance to complete the purchase, than the speculative 
                                                          
(2008) 40 Environment and Planning A 520; Susan J. Smith, Beverley A. Searle and Nicole Cook, ‘Rethinking the 
Risks of Home Ownership’ (2008) 38 Journal of Social Policy 83. 
11 Rob Kitchin, Justin Gleeson, Karen Keaveney, Cian O’Callaghan, A Haunted Landscape: Housing and Ghost 
Estates in Post- Celtic Tiger Ireland (2010, National Institute for Regional and Spatial Analysis). 
12 Kenna, supra n. 6, 1.09. 
13 Derek Brawn, Ireland’s House Party: What the Estate Agents don’t want you to know (2009, Gill & Macmillan), 
13. 
14 Ibid, 256. 
15 Kenna, supra n. 6, 1.08. 
16 Brawn, supra n. 13, 68. 
17 Michael Punch, The Irish Housing System: Vision, Values, Reality (2009, Jesuit Centre for Faith & Justice). 
18 PJ Drudy and Michael Punch, Out of Reach: Inequalities in the Irish Housing System (2004, Dublin,tasc). 
19 PJ Drudy, ‘Housing in Ireland: Philosophy, Affordability and Access’ (2007) 36 Journal of the Statistical and 
Social Inquiry Society of Ireland 84, 94. 
20 Brawn, supra n. 13, 202. 
21 Drudy & Punch, supra ns 6 & 18; Drudy, supra n. 19; Michelle Norris & Patrick Shiels, ‘Housing Affordability in 
the Republic of Ireland: Is Planning Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?’ (2007) Housing Studies, 22:1; 
Punch, supra n. 17; Kitchin et al, supra n.11.   
investor who could manage to complete the purchase by liquidising other assets.  Where 
there is evidence that a vendor has been engaging in reckless speculation that is also 
something that arguably should be taken into account in balancing the equities between the 
parties, as should any hardship the vendor may suffer if the sale cannot go through.  It should 
also be recalled that apartment sales are almost invariably ‘off the plans’ and not ‘subject to 
finance’.           
 
 
Impecuniosity as a Defence to Specific Performance 
 
 
To a limited and rather uncertain extent courts in England, Ireland, Australia and New Zealand 
have recognised over the last decade or so that the purchaser’s inability to pay the purchase 
price may constitute a defence to a vendor’s application for specific performance.  Unlike the 
Semelhago principle and the suggestion that the affirmative mutuality principle should be 
abolished in vendors’ application cases discussed below, the impecuniosity defence retains 
the essential framework of specific performance in the sense that there is a presumption that 
the vendor should get it unless a reason is shown to rebut that presumption.  The approach 
taken below is to review the case law jurisdiction by jurisdiction and then attempt to distil a 
set of principles that appear to be reasonably well settled from those decisions.  This section 
of the article will conclude by considering whether these principles are a satisfactory way of 





It seems that in England the only case that has considered the impecuniosity defence is Matila 
Ltd v Lisheen Properties Ltd.22  The defendant purchasers of several apartments stated that as 
a result of delay in completion of the building project and the fall in the market value of the 
property they were unable to obtain funding to complete the purchases.  HHJ Stephen Davies 
first considered whether the defendants might have a defence based on hardship.  The judge 
referred to the decision of Goulding J in Patel v Ali23 and stated that any hardship had to be 
of a very severe and extraordinary kind to be capable of amounting to a defence to specific 
performance.  The defendants had not provided sufficient evidence of hardship and so this 
defence did not avail them.  The judge was also of the view that hardship that could not be 
laid at the door of the claimant, particularly hardship which the defendant brought upon 
itself, would not normally be of any help to a defendant.24  In this connection it is worth noting 
another decision cited by Dr Dowling,25 Francis v Cowcliffe Ltd,26 which involved an action 
against a landlord for breach of a covenant to provide and maintain a lift.  The defence was 
                                                          
22 [2010] EWHC 1832 (Ch). 
23 [1984] Ch 283, at [245] ibid. 
24 Ibid.   
25 Alan Dowling, ‘Vendors’ application for specific performance’ (2011) Conveyancer & Property Lawyer 208, 210-
211. 
26 (1976) 33 P & CR 368 (ChD). 
hardship based on inability to fund the work required.  HHJ Rubin dismissed this in the 
following terms:-27 
 
“[i]f ever there was a case in which the defendants [sic] has brought the hardship on 
itself, this must be it.  The defendants chose to purchase and embark upon an 
expensive scheme for development of the property without any or any adequate 
finance and without making any but the most speculative arrangements for such 
finance.” 
 
Given the undoubted tendency of some purchasers to find ways to afford appreciating assets 
and find difficulties only in paying for the depreciating this is potentially a telling statement. 
 
The judge then moved on to consider an alternative defence that the purchasers were simply 
not able to comply with a specific performance order because they could not find the funds 
to do so.  He decided that this could be a defence, that it was not equitable to put the 
defendant at risk of committal for non-compliance, and that it was an insufficient answer to 
this that the defendant could apply to discharge the order.28  However any defendant seeking 
to rely on such a defence had to make the fullest possible disclosure of their financial position, 
which the defendants in this case had not done, so specific performance was granted.  
 
 
Republic of Ireland 
 
Financial difficulties for purchasers were the subject of detailed consideration by the High 
Court in Aranbel Ltd v Darcy & Ors.29  The three test cases determined in this judgment were 
all classic examples of investment purchases of apartments ‘off the plans’ and not ‘subject to 
finance’.  Between contract and completion the value of the properties fell by about 50% and 
the defendant purchasers were experiencing considerable difficulty in raising the purchase 
price either by borrowing or by a mixture of borrowing and liquidising other assets.  A fall in 
realisable value on this scale clearly made forfeiting the 10% deposit an unsatisfactory remedy 
for the vendor. 
 
Clarke J decided that specific performance should not be granted where it was clear that the 
purchaser could not pay the contract price either by borrowing or liquidising other assets or 
a combination of the two.  This is an impossibility defence, not hardship.30  Hardship is a 
separate issue to which attention is given below.  In relation to impossibility Clarke J indicated 
that if it appeared that there might be some realistic possibility that the purchaser could pay 
within a realistic timeframe specific performance could be ordered on the understanding that, 
if despite best endeavours, it proved impossible to complete, the order could be discharged 
and damages in lieu assessed.  If the failure to comply in these circumstances were due to 
steps taken or not taken by the purchaser after the order was made the purchaser could face 
penal sanctions for contempt of court provided the purchaser were culpable in this regard.31   
                                                          
27 Ibid, 375. 
28 [2010] EWHC 1832 (Ch), [248].  
29 [2010] IEHC 272. 
30 Ibid, 2.7. 
31 Ibid, 2.3-2.10.  
 
Clarke J stressed that the onus of proving an impossibility defence rested squarely on the 
purchaser who “must put before the court all reasonable evidence necessary to allow the 
court to assess whether there is a true case of impossibility.”32  He also made it clear “that 
inability to complete is not the same thing as inability to complete in the way originally 
intended.”33  If a purchaser could not get a mortgage to cover the contract price but could 
raise the money by liquidising other assets (including a family home) and obtaining a smaller 
mortgage on the property to be purchased, this would not be a case of impossibility.34  It 
might well be a case of hardship to which attention will now be turned.     
 
Clarke J made clear that he was making no definitive ruling on the way in which hardship 
jurisprudence might apply in cases where the purchaser could not complete although he did 
say that if the only way a purchaser could complete was by disposing of a family home or 
business assets “[t]here would be an obvious reluctance on the part of a court to require such 
a course of action.”35  In one of the three cases before the court it appeared that after 
completion was due the defendants came into some property by inheritance.  It also 
appeared that, at that time, the defendants were embarked on an extension to their family 
home and that much of the inheritance was applied towards discharging liabilities to builders 
working on that extension.  Clarke J took the view that the impossibility question had to be 
judged at the date of the court order, so even if the defendants had made it impossible to pay 
the purchase price because they had chosen to apply the inheritance to the builders working 
on their house extension, a decree of specific performance should be refused.36  However the 
judge recognised that the answer might be different where the defendants were relying on 
hardship arising out of something they chose to do between the date for completion and the 





An impossibility defence was recognised by the High Court (Deeny J) in Titanic Quarter Ltd v 
Rowe,38 decided just a few weeks after Aranbel Ltd v Darcy.  In this case the defendant 
purchaser was a young professional who owned his own dwelling and who contracted to buy 
an ‘off the plans’ not ‘subject to finance’ apartment as a more expensive residence.  His 
inability to pay was due to becoming unemployed in the recession that accompanied the 
property crash, which forced him to sell his current dwelling and move back in with his 
parents.  The vendor brought a summary judgment specific performance application and the 
defendant pleaded impossibility and hardship in his defence.  The hardship defence was 
abandoned and Deeny J said that he did not propose to comment on whether hardship falling 
                                                          
32 Ibid, 5.2-5.3.  In Wynn Clons Development Ltd v Cooke [2012] IEHC 385, [34] (HC) Laffoy J agreed with this 
statement. 
33 Ibid, 5.2. 
34 Ibid, 2.8, 5.2. 
35 Ibid, 5.6. 
36 Ibid, 5.4. 
37 Ibid, 5.5.  This presumably means that where the hardship is something the defendant brings on himself the 
court might be less inclined to extend mercy.  See Francis v Cowliffe n. 26 supra. 
38 [2010] NICh 14. 
short of Patel v Ali might suffice.39  In holding that the impossibility defence was one that 
might possibly succeed at trial and thus refusing summary judgment, the judge recognised 
that in principle this defence is available in Northern Ireland.40  Any defendant wishing to 
plead inability to pay must file a full and frank affidavit detailing their financial position.41 In 
relation to impossibility the approach taken by courts in Northern Ireland would appear to be 





The defendant’s inability to pay the purchase price is fairly well established as a defence in 
Australia42 but it is by no means easy to persuade a court that the presumption in favour of 
specific performance for the vendor should be displaced.43  The decisions do not always 
distinguish between impossibility and hardship44 but whichever way it is put it is clear that 
the burden rests upon the purchaser to convince the court that (s)he has insufficient access 
to funds to be able to complete the purchase.45  The purchaser must make the fullest 
disclosure of his or her financial position and if there are any gaps in this evidence or it seems 
that there may be some way that finance can be obtained specific performance is likely to be 
granted.46  Australian47 and New Zealand courts48 have been much influenced by the following 
passage in Spry, The Principles of Equitable Remedies:-49    
 
“It is clearly established that the courts will not require that to be done which cannot 
be done. … 
But this is not to say that the mere anticipation of possible difficulties leads to a refusal 
of relief.  If, on the materials before the Court, performance may or may not be able 
                                                          
39 Ibid, [11]. 
40 Ibid, [22]. 
41 Ibid, [5].  In Northern Ireland this is referred to as a Rowe affidavit. 
42 For a thorough discussion of the Australian and New Zealand material on this subject see Alan Dowling, 
‘Vendors’ application for specific performance’ (2011) Conveyancer & Property Lawyer 208, 214-220.  
43 Khash Holdings Pty Ltd v Varma [2005] NSWSC 1215; Boyarsky v Taylor [2008] NSWSC 1415; Rural View 
Developments P/L v Fastfort P/L & Anor [2009] QSC 244; Fairborne Pty Ltd v Strata Store Noosa Pty Ltd [2009] 
QSC 250; Bovino Pty Ltd v The Casey Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2010] VSC 391; Lindaning Pty Ltd v Gore [2011] QSC 
266; Evans & Anor v Robcorp Pty Ltd [2014] QSC 26. 
44 Boyarsky v Taylor ibid; Bovino Pty Ltd v The Casey Group Holdings Ltd ibid. 
45 Khash Holdings Pty Ltd v Varma [2005] NSWSC 1215; Boyarsky v Taylor [2008] NSWSC 1415; Bovino Pty Ltd v 
The Casey Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2010] VSC 391; Lindaning Pty Ltd v Gore [2011] QSC 266; Evans & Anor v 
Robcorp Pty Ltd [2014] QSC 26.  
46 Rural View Developments P/L v Fastfort P/L & Anor [2009] QSC 244 where specific performance was granted 
because it appeared that the defendant might be able to raise funds from within the defendant’s corporate 
group.  To similar effect were Fairborne Pty Ltd v Strata Store Noosa Pty [2009] QSC 250 and Bovino Pty Ltd v 
The Casey Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2010] VSC 391.  See also Lindaning Pty Ltd v Gore [2011] QSC 266 where the 
various gaps in the defendant’s evidence included failure to disclose efforts made to raise finance elsewhere.  In 
Boyarsky v Taylor [2008] NSWSC 1415 specific performance was granted because it appeared that the purchaser 
would acquire a share of property jointly owned with his former wife sufficient to enable completion. 
47 Boyarsky v Taylor [2008] NSWSC 1415; Bovino Pty Ltd v The Casey Group Holdings Ltd [2010] VSC 391. 
48 Prime Resources Co Ltd v Kumar [2007] NZHC 439; Ngai Tahu Property Ltd v Dykstra & Anor, High Court of 
New Zealand, Christchurch Registry, 29 October 2009, CIV–2009-409-000809; Wealth Buy Property Ltd v 
Stevenson [2012] NZHC 1609.   
49 (8th ed, 2010, Lawbook Co, Sydney), 128-129. 
to be completed, the various probabilities will be taken into account in deciding on 
the order that is most just in all the circumstances.  Thus it may be appropriate to 
order specific performance in the ordinary manner, so that if necessary the defendant 
may later approach the Court for a modification or variation by reason of subsequent 
difficulties or may rely upon them in subsequent proceedings in relation to the 
enforcement of the order.  Again, if at the time of the original application there is 
shown to be a substantial risk that performance will not be possible, it may be most 
appropriate to make a conditional order or else to adjourn the proceedings until the 
position becomes more clear.  Finally, if a sufficiently great likelihood is shown that 
performance will not be possible, and especially if no strong considerations of 
hardship appear on the part of the plaintiff, it may be most just to make no order for 
specific performance at all, whether absolute or conditional, and so to confine the 
plaintiff to remedies in damages.” 
 
The context in which this passage has been relied on has tended to be one where the 
defendant is urging the court not to grant specific performance because if (s)he proved unable 
to comply with the order (s)he might be imprisoned for contempt of court.  This passage 
answers those fears by pointing out that contempt is a last resort only to be used in clear 
cases of wilful disobedience of the court order.  Where the defendant can show that 
performance was in the end impossible the original order can be varied or discharged and the 
vendor left to damages in lieu of specific performance.50  Since the contempt sanction is 
unlikely the court does not want to be acceding to defendants’ pleas of impossibility too 
readily because then performance will be lost when it could with some ‘tough love’ have been 





Dr Dowling has asserted that “[b]y far the richest seam of authority on whether the inability 
of a purchaser to raise the purchase money affords a defence to an action by a vendor for 
specific performance is to be found in New Zealand.”51  With this observation it is impossible 
to disagree.  Eleven High Court decisions within the last decade offer the most lucid 
explanation of the inability to pay defence currently available.  All of these cases were 
summary judgment applications for specific performance where the vendor had to 
demonstrate that there was no reasonable chance of the purchaser succeeding with the 
defence if the matter were to come to trial.  The following propositions can be advanced with 
confidence. 
 
First, on some occasions the High Court has not made any effort to distinguish ‘impossibility’ 
from ‘hardship’.52  On the face of it this would not appear to exhibit the kind of lucidity praised 
above but in reality it does helpfully clarify the ‘inability to pay’ defence.  In terms of what the 
purchaser must prove as a defence there is no realistic difference between impossibility and 
                                                          
50 See Waitarere Rise Ltd v Rangi [2010] NZHC 403; Great Northern Land Co Ltd v Crowley [1944] NZHC 1944; 
Wealth Buy Property Ltd v Stevenson [2012] NZHC 1609. 
51 Alan Dowling, ‘Vendors’ application for specific performance’ (2011) Conveyancer & Property Lawyer 208, 216. 
52 Millbrook Country Club Ltd v SFM Investments Ltd [2009] NZHC 2502; Bos International (Australia) Ltd v 
Griffiths, High Court of New Zealand, Auckland Registry, 1 December 2009, CIV 2009-404-004911.  
hardship because the hardship that the purchaser may rely on is the hardship of having to pay 
when unable to do so, with the accompanying risk of penal sanctions for failure.  If hardship 
is indistinguishable from impossibility doubt must therefore be expressed as to whether a 
court should refuse specific performance in the scenario raised by Clarke J in Aranbel Ltd v 
Darcy53 of the purchaser who could pay the purchase price if other assets (including even a 
family home) were liquidised.  It is noteworthy that summary judgment was entered in 
Matarangi Beach Estates Ltd v Dawson54 because were the trustee of the purchasers’ home 
to agree to sell it (as seemed likely) the purchasers would be able to raise the remainder of 
the purchase price for two units by mortgage.  The role played by hardship in these cases 
seems to be more a matter of the hardship that would be suffered by the vendor if specific 
performance were refused.  This is explained more fully below.  Finally in this context it should 
be pointed out that in Prime Resources Co Ltd v Kumar55 futility was distinguished from 
impossibility as something which provided insufficient probability of benefit to the plaintiff to 
justify making the order. 
 
Secondly, impossibility is an affirmative defence which at trial the purchaser must prove 
before specific performance can be refused.56  In Ngai Tahu Property Ltd v Dykstra57 Osborne 
JA said that “[a]nything less than a very substantial probability that performance will be 
impossible is insufficient – anticipation of possible difficulties or even a demonstrated 
difficulty in finding purchase money is unlikely to constitute a defence of impossibility.”  In 
summary judgment cases the vendor must show that there is no reasonable possibility that 
the purchaser could establish this defence at trial.  In Cable Bay Sections Ltd v Sufan Wu58 the 
purchaser did just enough to defeat summary judgment but ultimately lost the specific 
performance issue at trial59 because it appeared that he could obtain funding from third 
parties in China.  Specific performance was granted on a summary judgment application in 
Matarangi Beach Estates Ltd v Dawson60 because the purchasers’ home was available as 
funding.61  A failure to produce full evidence of the purchasers’ financial circumstances and 
efforts made to obtain funding resulted in summary judgment being granted in Gilbert v 
Manninen62 and Millbrook Country Club Ltd v SFM Investments Ltd.63  In Wealth Buy Property 
Ltd v Stevenson64 summary judgment was granted because it appeared that the purchasers 
had access to finance and that their circumstances had not changed significantly since the 
contract was signed.  They had concerns about whether they could keep up payments on a 
mortgage but Abbott AJ said if that proved to be the case they could sell the property.  The 
case was a classic illustration of being able to afford an appreciating asset but not a 
depreciating one.    
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Perhaps the most useful feature of the New Zealand decisions is the clear rationale they 
provide for the inability to pay defence.  The purchaser bears a heavy burden of proof that 
payment is impossible because of the sanctity of contract and the hardship that would be 
experienced by the vendor trying to resell the property on a falling market.65  There is little 
express acknowledgement of the considerations favouring specific performance identified by 
Professor Chambers below66 but it is implicit in the courts’ reasoning that specific 
performance is the accepted remedy for sale of land contracts and that contracting parties 
should receive their legitimate expectations unless there is a very good reason why not.  
Purchasers ought not to be permitted to avoid honouring their contractual commitments 
unless there has been a very significant change of circumstances since the contract was signed 
that makes it impossible for them to perform.  In so far as this defence is about hardship, it is 
more a question of the hardship that would be suffered by the vendor if the property had to 
be resold on a falling market.  Hardship to the purchaser is essentially the same as 
impossibility in that it is hardship to make someone pay what they cannot but this requires 
that the purchaser prove that payment cannot be made.  It is not a hardship to the purchaser 
to make a specific performance order only to find out later that the purchaser cannot pay 
because committal for contempt would only be imposed in clear cases of non-payment 
despite the means to pay.67  This conception of hardship does not make it seem likely that a 
court should be particularly reluctant to grant specific performance on the ground that the 
purchaser would have to sell a family home to be able to raise the purchase price of another 





From the above case law in England, Ireland, Australia and New Zealand it is possible to state 
the following propositions.  First, the purchaser’s inability to raise the purchase price and 
complete a contract for the sale of land may afford a defence to specific performance.  
Secondly, the basis of this defence has been expressed as the impossibility of the purchaser 
complying with the order in any reasonable timeframe.  As Dr Dowling has pointed out this 
concept of impossibility should not be confused with futility.68  Futility, as explained above,69 
means that no benefit would accrue to the vendor from making the order.  The vendor may 
prefer to have a specific performance order to keep the contract alive and subsequently use 
the vendor’s lien for security of the purchase price to engineer a sale when the market has 
recovered somewhat.  Thirdly, impossibility is not the same thing as hardship, although there 
is obvious overlap in the sense that hardship is caused by making someone do what they 
cannot.  The sanctity of contract dictates that bargains must be kept where they can.  A 
purchaser who can complete a contract by selling a family home should generally be required 
to do that.  Only a case of extreme hardship, such as forcing a large family to move into a one 
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66 Infra n.88. 
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69 Supra, n. 88. 
bedroom apartment, could reasonably justify refusing specific performance here.  Fourthly, 
the burden of proof rests on the purchaser to displace the normal rule of Contract Law by full, 
clear and convincing evidence that (s)he cannot pay.  The benefit of the doubt should go to 
the vendor because committal for contempt will not follow as an immediate consequence of 
failure to pay.    
 
The ‘impecuniosity’ defence is a careful and fundamentally conservative response to a serious 
crisis in the market for real estate.  The first instance judgments discussed above go as far as 
they reasonably can in adjusting traditional principles to address this crisis.  They do not lay 
down new law.  The defence cannot be described as an ‘impossibility’ defence alone.  In the 
example given above of the large family being forced to sell the family home and move into 
a small apartment it can be seen that specific performance could well be refused even if 
payment were possible.  What is ‘impossible’ and whether ‘hardship’ is sufficiently severe to 
merit leaving the vendor to a remedy in damages is likely to require much case by case 
adjudication with accompanying problems in terms of uncertainty and costs.  This poses the 
question of whether a better solution to this problem could be found elsewhere.  The 
remainder of this article addresses this question. 
 
 
A Canadian Approach – the Semelhago Principle 
 
 
In Canada the courts have abandoned the presumption in real estate contracts that specific 
performance should be awarded unless some good reason is shown why it should not.  The 
Canadian approach derives mostly from the following dictum of Sopinka J in Semelhago v 
Paramadevan:-70 
 
“While at one time the common law regarded every piece of real estate to be unique, 
with the progress of modern real estate development this is no longer the case.  
Residential, business and industrial properties are all mass produced much in the same 
way as other consumer products.  If a deal falls through for one property, another is 
frequently, though not always, readily available. 
  It is no longer appropriate, therefore, to maintain a distinction in the approach to 
specific performance as between realty and personalty.  It cannot be assumed that 
damages for breach of contract for the purchase and sale of real estate will be an 
inadequate remedy in all cases.  The common law recognised that the distinction 
might not be valid when the land had no peculiar or special value.    
  Specific performance should, therefore, not be granted as a matter of course absent 
evidence that the property is unique to the extent that its substitute would not be 
readily available.” 
 
Beginning with purchaser applications for specific performance uniqueness means that 
damages would not be an adequate remedy for the vendor’s failure to convey the property 
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to the purchaser.  It is well established that if the purchaser is buying a property purely as an 
investment then damages will be an adequate remedy.71  However pure investment 
purchases have not been treated in the same way as development purchases.  In John E. 
Dodge Holdings Ltd v 805062 Ontario Ltd72 the purchaser was buying land on which it 
intended to build a hotel complex.  Damages were held to be inadequate and specific 
performance was awarded because the lands were considered to be especially suitable for 
the purchaser’s development due to the attractive price, advantageous financing, 
advantageous site and zoning characteristics, good visibility and access, proximity to 
significant market attractions and commercial and residential development activity, and 
synergies associated with the purchaser’s nearby existing hotel.  The purchaser bears the 
burden of proving uniqueness but this does not require proof that there is no exact same 
property as the one the purchaser wished to buy.  The question is whether “the property has 
a quality (or qualities) that makes it especially suitable for the proposed use that cannot be 
reasonably duplicated elsewhere.”73  However Professor Berryman has pointed out that as 
developers’ interests are economic they usually fail to show the inadequacy of damages,74 
and on that basis damages would probably have been adequate in that case. 
 
The purchaser of a residence will usually have a better chance of demonstrating some reason 
why specific performance should be granted.75  But the mere fact that a property is to be used 
as a residence will not be sufficient of itself to rebut the presumption in favour of damages.  
In Serebrennikov v Sawyer’s Landing Investments 1 Ltd76 the purchaser entered into a contract 
to purchase a house to be built.  The house was not built and the purchaser bought a fairly 
comparable property in the same neighbourhood for a higher price.  Specific performance of 
the unbuilt property with abatement of the purchase price was refused notwithstanding the 
efforts made by the purchaser to show substantial differences between the two properties.  
What was significant for the court was that the substitute home was an acceptable substitute 
and that damages could compensate for the higher price.77 
 
The Semelhago principle does not in itself take away from the mutuality principle at the heart 
of specific performance for the sale of an interest in land.  This is the idea that if the purchaser 
can get specific performance against the vendor then the vendor must be able to get it against 
the purchaser.  Hence it will come as no surprise to find that the Semelhago principle similarly 
requires a vendor seeking specific performance to demonstrate that the property is unique in 
the sense that damages would be an inadequate remedy.78  Specific performance was 
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72 Ibid. 
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awarded to vendors in Scully v Cerney79 and Westwood Plateau Partnership v WSP 
Construction Ltd80 because the contracts were partly executed so far as the purchaser had 
gone into possession and made substantial improvements to the land.  Termination of the 
contract would have meant that the vendor did not get back the same thing that would have 
been conveyed had the contract been specifically performed.  In Hoover v Mark Minor Homes 
Inc81 and Comet Investments Ltd v Northwind Logging Ltd82 specific performance was 
awarded because the land was sufficiently unique that there was a very limited market for its 
sale.83  In Inmet Mining Corp v Homestake Canada Inc84 the issue was whether damages 
should be awarded in lieu of specific performance (assessed at the date of judgment) or at 
common law (assessed at the date of breach).85  For the former the property had to be shown 
to be unique so as to make the case in principle suitable for specific performance.86  It was 
held that uniqueness had been demonstrated because the mine produced the lowest grade 
of gold mined in North America.  Professor Berryman has doubted whether the difficulty in 
selling property is a sufficient reason for awarding specific performance.  Rarely will there be 
no market, the vendor’s loss is essentially economic and thus capable of being compensated 
by damages, and this approach treats the vendor of real estate more favourably than the 





Mention of investment purchases and the economic interests of vendors prompts 
consideration of the question whether the Semelhago principle might offer a solution to the 
problem of purchasers’ inability to raise the purchase price.  It seems that vendors are likely 
to find it more difficult than purchasers to show that damages are an inadequate remedy for 
the purchaser’s failure to perform and would thus not be successful in obtaining specific 
performance very often.  In the end, however, this is not truly a solution to this problem.  It 
confuses the vendor’s difficulty in obtaining an adequate remedy for losing the sale with the 
purchaser’s difficulty in raising the price.  A vendor might well find itself in a position similar 
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to the vendors’ in the Hoover and Comet Investments cases above but seeking specific 
performance against a purchaser simply unable to pay.         
 
Semelhago should be rejected both as a solution to the ‘can’t pay’ problem and also in general 
terms for the reasons advanced by Professor Chambers in his sustained attack on the 
Semelhago principle.88  The fundamental criticism levelled here is that the previous remedial 
regime had not been shown to be broken and did not need to be fixed.  Three unwelcome 
consequences follow from the Supreme Court’s poorly thought through change of direction.  
First, by treating purchasers differently according to their reasons for wanting to buy the 
property and whether they could show the inadequacy of damages in those circumstances 
Semelhago introduces unwelcome uncertainty into the law.  This was identified above as a 
problem with the ‘impecuniosity’ defence.  Secondly, it presents purchasers with a difficult 
decision to make as to whether to seek specific performance.  A purchaser who is held to have 
done so unreasonably may be treated as someone who failed to mitigate their loss.  This 
would result in damages being assessed as the difference between contract price and market 
price at or shortly after the date of breach.  In a rising market this might well make it difficult 
for the purchaser to afford a comparable property after trial.89  Thirdly, the abolition of the 
‘right’ to specific performance would have profound consequences for the legal relationship 
between vendor and purchaser between contract of sale in the first instance and conveyance 
and payment of the purchase price subsequently.  This relationship was described by Jessel 
MR in Lysaght v Edwards as follows:-90 
 
“It appears to me that the effect of a contract for sale has been settled for more than 
two centuries … [T]he moment you have a valid contract for sale the vendor becomes 
in equity a trustee for the purchaser of the estate sold, and the beneficial ownership 
passes to the purchaser, the vendor having the right to the purchase money, a charge 
or lien on the estate for the security of that purchase-money, and a right to retain 
possession of the estate until the purchase money is paid, in the absence of express 
contract as to the time of delivering possession.”     
 
Unless the contract provides otherwise the risk of damage by fire passes to the purchaser on 
contract,91 and the purchaser’s equitable interest takes priority over the vendor’s trustee in 
bankruptcy or liquidator and any third party claiming an interest in the property if the latter 
has notice of the purchaser’s rights.92  If specific performance is not at least prima facie 
available “then most purchasers do not acquire a beneficial interest in the land being sold, 
bear no risk of loss that needs to be insured, and have no property rights that can be protected 
by caveat or registration or enforced against third parties who might acquire competing 
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interests in the land.”93  The most fundamental flaw in the Semelhago principle is that it treats 
specific performance in the context of contracts for the sale of land simply as a remedy for 
breach of contract when it is much more than this, in truth an integral part of the 
conveyancing process.  Recognition that significant change to the rights and duties of vendors 
and purchasers is a consequence of abolishing the presumption in favour of specific 
performance is not a feature of any of these decisions.  Therefore it is submitted that there is 






Specific performance has been the normal remedy for breach of a contract to sell an interest 
in land effectively since time immemorial.  It is unnecessary in this article to explain in any 
detail why this is so, not at any rate so far as purchasers are concerned.  In broad terms the 
perception has been that every parcel of land is unique so that damages could not adequately 
compensate the purchaser for not obtaining ‘her dream house’.  Whatever the merits of this 
position it does not explain why specific performance should be the normal remedy for 
vendors.  The vendor wants money and while the purchase price would exceed damages for 
breach of contract (calculated as the difference between market price and contract price) this 
does not explain why compensation for the financial loss of missing out on a sale would not 
be a sufficient remedy.  The reason why the vendor would normally be awarded specific 
performance is the mutuality principle.  If the purchaser can get specific performance against 
the vendor justice and equity demand that the vendor should be able to get it against the 
purchaser.  ‘Equality is equity’, it is often said. 
 
This ‘affirmative’ notion of mutuality substantially derives from the sixth edition of Sir Edward 
Fry’s treatise on Specific Performance94 where it is expressed in the following terms:- 
 
“A contract to be specifically enforced by the courts must as a general rule, be mutual 
– that is to say, such that it might, at the time it was entered into, have been enforced 
by either of the parties against the other of them.” 
 
There are at least two flaws in this notion of mutuality.  First, it asks the question about 
mutuality at the wrong time, when the contract is entered into.  Why should a contract that 
is not specifically enforceable when it is entered into not become specifically enforceable 
afterwards if something changes that would have made it specifically enforceable when it was 
entered into?  Secondly, this apparently rigid requirement that a contract must be mutual 
otherwise it will not be specifically enforceable, is contrary to the way that equitable 
discretionary principles normally work.  Generally one asks if there is some reason, such as an 
absence of mutuality, why the equitable remedy should not be granted?  And this question 
would be asked at the time the court is asked to grant relief.  Professor Ames attacked 
affirmative mutuality as having so many exceptions that it was almost meaningless.95 
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Another theory of mutuality, negative mutuality, rests upon more rational foundations.  
Favoured by Spry96 and Sharpe97 this theory was judicially endorsed by the Court of Appeal in 
Price v Strange.98  It is to the effect that mutuality is a discretionary defence to specific 
performance based on hardship to the defendant.  Goff LJ99 and Buckley LJ100 both described 
Fry’s statement of the law as unsupported by authority and wrong in principle.  Buckley LJ 
opined that the true principle was that:-101 
 
“ … the court will not compel a defendant to perform his obligations specifically if it 
cannot at the same time ensure that any unperformed obligations of the plaintiff will 
be specifically performed, unless, perhaps, damages would be an adequate remedy to 
the defendant for any default on the plaintiff’s part.” 
 
Goff LJ expressed himself more widely as follows:-102 
 
“ … want of mutuality raises a question of the court’s discretion to be exercised 
according to everything that has happened up to the decree.” 
 
It will be noticed from each of these statements that mutuality is to be assessed at judgment 
as opposed to contract and that it is a discretionary principle as opposed to the rigid rule Fry 
propounded.  Jones and Goodhart favour the more flexible approach of Goff LJ as more in 
keeping with the general principles of equitable discretion103 and to this author that would 
seem to be correct.  As applied to the facts of that case there was no potential hardship to 
the defendant in relation to the important repairing obligations because these had been 
carried out, some by the defendant herself. 
 
It is not easy to see how the negative mutuality principle applied in Price v Strange would 
apply in the context of vendors’ applications for specific performance of contracts for the sale 
of land.  Therefore the value of this decision and the argument above lies in their undermining 
of the affirmative mutuality base for specific performance in these cases.  In the context of 
purchasers who cannot pay the purchase price this would mean that case by case adjudication 
of whether the purchaser can or cannot pay or can only pay if severe hardship is experienced 
would be unnecessary.  This would introduce some welcome certainty into the law and reduce 
unnecessary legal costs.  There would be no injustice for vendors who would be entitled to 
an adequate damages remedy for the purchasers’ breach.104  Neither would there be any 
adverse consequences for the conveyancing system as there would be if specific performance 
ceased to be a purchaser’s ‘entitlement’.  The vendor has a lien on the property for securing 
the purchase price but this means the vendor has a right to retain possession of the property 
until paid and where the property is conveyed to the purchaser the vendor’s lien is equitable 
and allows an application to be made to the court for an order for sale of the land and 
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payment of the outstanding purchase price from the proceeds.105  In the former the vendor 
simply terminates the contract and seeks damages for breach.  In the latter the vendor’s 
position is like a mortgagee’s and so a secured creditor’s action may be brought against the 
purchaser for payment of the price,106 or alternatively the property is re-conveyed to the 
vendor.           
 
So the recommendation of this article is that vendors of land should never get specific 
performance against the purchaser.  In making this recommendation it is acknowledged that 
vendors often have good reason for preferring specific performance to damages.  The vendor 
of a private house, as opposed to a developer constructing a large apartment building, may 
need to sell their current dwelling to finance the purchase of the house to which the vendor 
intends to move.  If the purchaser capriciously withdrew from the sale damages or forfeiture 
of deposit might be a poor substitute for specific performance in this context.  But it is unlikely 
that there would be many instances of purchasers exposing themselves to this sort of cost 
without reason.  Inability to pay will be the reason for purchasers not completing in the vast 
majority of cases and in those cases specific performance for the vendor will be unworkable.     
 




This article has considered the ‘impecuniosity’ problem in contracts for the sale of an interest 
in land in the particular context of apartments sold ‘off the plans’ without a ‘subject to 
finance’ clause.  Case law in England, both Irish jurisdictions, Australia and New Zealand, has 
been discussed and the view expressed that courts in these jurisdictions have hatched a 
pragmatic and realistic means of dealing with the problem.  The approach of the courts in 
these jurisdictions is conservative and leaves untouched the fundamental principles of 
specific performance as applied in this area.  Being first instance decisions this was all that 
courts could realistically do.  It is not a panacea for the problem of purchasers’ inability to pay 
as they will still be left with a liability to pay damages many of them will be unable to meet.  
It also comes with some costs in terms of legal uncertainty and legal costs occasioned by the 
case by case adjudications courts must engage in to decide if payment is ‘impossible’ or gives 
rise to excessive hardship.  These costs prompted consideration of the question whether 
there might be a better way of dealing with this problem and two other approaches were 
then considered. 
      
The first of these, the Canadian Semelhago principle, is by far the more radical of the two.  
This would effectively abolish the presumption in favour of specific performance in all sales 
of an interest in land, whether the applicant was purchaser or vendor.  For the reasons stated 
by Professor Chambers considerable reservation has to be expressed about the wisdom of 
this approach.  Like ‘impecuniosity’ it is likely to introduce much uncertainty into this area of 
the law as courts make case by case decisions on whether a particular property passes the 
‘uniqueness’ test and thus qualifies for specific performance.  It ignores the important 
institutional significance of specific performance in land contracts and the rights and duties 
of contracting parties that depend on them.  To this may be added the objection that this 
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remedy is established law and that contracting parties will be advised by their lawyers that if 
the other party does not perform the court will probably make them perform.  It could well 
put purchasers in a difficult position, unsure whether to seek specific performance because 
of the risk that the court will decide that they should have mitigated loss and settled for 
damages at the breach stage.  In any event Semelhago is not necessarily a solution to the 
inability to pay problem because the vendor may be able to demonstrate a degree of 
uniqueness in a case where the purchaser still cannot pay.  The principle has not been 
received in any of the other common law jurisdictions covered in this article and there seems 
no reason to believe that it will catch on any time soon.     
 
Finally the article considered how the mutuality principle might be reformed to provide a 
solution to inability to pay cases.  This would involve preserving the purchaser’s right to obtain 
specific performance against the vendor but abolishing the vendor’s right to get specific 
performance against the purchaser.  This can be supported on the basis that specific 
performance for the vendor rests on a discredited affirmative mutuality principle and that the 
vendor’s interest would be adequately compensated by damages.  There would also be no 
interference with the conveyancing process like those that would follow from Semelhago 
where the purchaser was seeking the remedy.  The principal benefit of this approach would 
lie in the replacement of the case by case adjudication of the purchaser’s impecuniosity or 
hardship with the clear and certain rule that the vendor never gets specific performance.  The 
only arguments against abolishing specific performance for vendors are those from sanctity 
of contract and reasonable expectation explained above, as well as an intuitive sense that if 
the purchaser can get it then so should the vendor.  But these are weak bases for continuing 
with a principle that otherwise rests on flawed assumptions and leaves the potentially very 
uncertain ‘impecuniosity’ defence as the only escape route for problems spawned by the 
recession of the first part of the third millennium.   
 
The closing thought of this article is prompted by that ‘Great Recession’.  The objection is 
commonly enough made that people purchasing apartments as investments were gamblers 
who brought all the “melancholy consequences of debt and improvidence”107 upon 
themselves, and hence should be shown no sympathy.  Whatever truth there may be in this 
the fact remains that developers and vendors were just as guilty of gambling as were the 
purchasers.  Fashioning a solution to this problem and assessing its implications for the law 
of specific performance requires taking a balanced approach to the respective positions of 
both parties to the contract.  
                                                          
107 Re Citro [1991] Ch 142, at 157 (Nourse LJ). 
